Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

Lawrence P. Emery, Jennifer J. Emery, Karl H.
Seethaler v. Don W. Call, Linda Call : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Olson and Hoggan, P.C.; Miles P. Jensen; Counsel for Appellant.
Bearnson and Peck; Marty Moore; Counsel for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Seethaler v. Call, No. 20080228 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/780

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LAWRENCE P. EMERY,
JENNIFER J. EMERY, AND
Plaintiffs
KARL H. SEETHALER,

Appellate Case No. 20080228

Plaintiff/Appellant,

District Court No. 030100618

v.
DON W. CALL AND LINDA CALL,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF O F APPELLEES

Appeal from the First District Court, Cache County
The Honorable Gordon J. Low and The Honorable Timothy R. Hansen

OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C.
Miles P. Jensen
130 South Main, Suite 200
Logan, Utah 84321
(435)752-1551
mpj@oh-pc.com
Counsel for Appellant

BEARNSON & PECK, LC
Marty E. Moore (#8932)
399 North Main, Suite 300
Logan, UT 84321
(435) 787-9700
mmoore@cachelaw.com
Counsel for Appellees

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

SEP 1 7 2008

PARTIES BELOW
Plaintiffs:

Lawrence P. Emery
Jennifer J. Emery
Karl H. Seethaler

Defendants: Don W. Call
Linda Call
All three Plaintiffs/Appellants filed with this Court Appellants Emerys1 Motion to
Dismiss Appeal and Appellant Seethaler fs Stipulation to Dismissal and Appellants
Emerysf Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal, both of which were dated
May 12, 2008.
In an Order of Dismissal dated May 20, 2008, this Court dismissed this appeal.
However, on May 27, 2008, this Court issued its Order dismissing Plaintiffs/Appellants
Lawrence P. Emery and Jennifer J. Emery from this appeal.

PARTIES ON APPEAL
Appellant:

Karl H. Seethaler

Appellee:

Don W. Call and Linda Call

REFERENCES T O PARTIES AND CITATIONS T O RECORD
Plaintiff/Appellant Karl H Seethaler will be referred to herein as "Mr. Seethaler."
Plaintiff Lawrence P. Emery will be referred to herein as "Mr. Emery."
Defendants/Appellees Don W. Call and Linda Call will be referred to herein as "
the Calls." Mr. Call individually will be referred to as "Mr. Call."
For the sake of convenience, this Brief of Appellees' will use the same system of
citations to the record used in the Brief of Appellants.
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JURISDICTION O F THE COURT O F APPEALS
The Calls agree with Mr. Seethaler's statement of jurisdiction.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD O F REVIEW
The Calls rephrase the issues as follows.
ISSUE NO. 1

In the long-fought and difficult boundary dispute below, the trial court crafted
multiple equitable remedies after taking into account the parties' actions, the
circumstances surrounding those actions and the resulting "mess." Did the trial
court abuse its discretion by leaving a cement wall in place and allowing the Calls
to use a sliver of real property on their side of the wall even though the sliver of
land was on Mr. Seethaler's side of the boundary that the court had previously
found to be established by deed and boundary by acquiescence?
ISSUE N O . 2

Did Mr. Seethaler raise and preserve in the trial court his claim of "irreparable
harm"?
ISSUE N O . 3

Was the trial court's finding of fact in an equitable proceeding that "all parties in
this matter acted in good faith and no party acted in bad faith"1 clearly erroneous
because of insufficient evidence to support that finding?
STANDARD O F REVIEW
In this appeal from an equity proceeding, the "trial court's determination of the law
is reviewed under a correctness standard;" this Court should "afford no degree of

1

Interim Findings 2007, R at 427, f 1.
1

deference to a trial judge's determination of the law."2
As stated by the Supreme Court in an appeal from an equity proceeding:
A trial court's findings of fact will be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous. Although legal questions are reviewed for
correctness, we "may still grant a trial court discretion in its
application of the law to a given fact situation." We decide how
much discretion to give a trial court in applying the law to a
particular area by considering a number of factors 'pertinent to
the relative expertise of appellate and trial courts in addressing
those issues." Finally, "a trial court is accorded considerable latitude
and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy," and
will not be overturned unless it abused its discretion.
(Emphasis added; citations omitted.)3
Accordingly, as to the Calls' Issue No. 1, the standard of review is "abuse of
discretion." As to the Calls' Issue No. 2, there is no standard of review because Mr.
Seethaler did not raise this claim below and the trial court did not rule on it. As to the
Calls' Issue No. 3, the standard of review is "clearly erroneous."
The Calls dispute Mr. Seethaler's third issue (regarding an alleged de facto
condemnation of his property) and the correctness standard of review that he suggests
should be applied. As noted above, "'a trial court is accorded considerable latitude
and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy/' and will not be
overturned unless it abused its discretion." (Emphasis added, f
2

United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, \ 9,
79P.3d945,948.
3

Id.

"Id.
2

PRESERVATION O F ISSUES
Mr. Seethaler's claim in his brief that he was "irreparably harmed"5 by the
equitable remedies crafted by the trial court at the November 28, 2006 equity trial was
never raised before the trial court - either before or during the equity trial or in the 14
months between the time of the equity trial and the court's issuance of its Final Judgment
and Decree and plaintiffs' filing of their Notice of Appeal6 Nor was Mr. Seethaler's third
issue - regarding an alleged de facto right of condemnation - ever raised before the trial
court.7
The proceedings below were before the trial court sitting in equity. Accordingly,
the issues framed by the Calls were addressed by the court and preserved in the various
findings of fact and conclusions of law.8
CITATIONS O F DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS O F LAW
The Calls agree with Mr. Seethaler that there are no constitutional, statutory or
regulatory provisions that are determinative of the appeal or of central importance in this
matter.

5

Brief of Appellant, pp. 15-16, 18-19.

6

R. at pp. 284-487; 2006 T.; 4/2/2007 T.; 7/9/2007 T.; 11/19/2007 T.

"Id.
8

Findings 2005, R.at 195-214; Interim Findings 2007, R. at 437-436; 2008 Final
Findings R. at 477-479.
3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The Calls strenuously object to Mr. Seethaler's misleading assertions in his
Statement of the Case that the trial court's various findings of fact "collectively found
Calls knowingly built an encroaching wall on Seethaler's property" and that the wall was
"knowingly and intentionally built by the Calls on [Mr.] Seethaler's property."9 The trial
court never made such a finding in any of its 144 separate findings of fact in three
different documents and oral findings at the conclusion of trial proceedings.10 Indeed,
these statements are contradicted by the trial court's very first finding of fact in its Interim
Supplemental rindings of Fact and Conclusions of Law\n
1.
The Court finds that all parties in this matter acted in
good faith and that no party acted in bad faith.
As discussed at some length below, the Calls obtained a survey from a licensed
surveyor in November 2001 and proceeded to develop the north end of their parcel (the
"Call Property") in accordance with the boundary set by that survey. Although Mr.
Seethaler and the Emery plaintiffs obtained their own survey some seven to eight months
afterwards, no one could possibly know where the disputed boundary would ultimately be

9

Brief of Appellant, pp. 4, 8.

10

Findings 2005, R. at 195-214; Interim Findings 2007, R. at 437-436; Final
Findings R. at 477-479; T. Vol. Ill, pp.
11

Interim Findings 2007, R. at 437.
4

set until the trial court made that determination on July 1, 2004 at the conclusion of a 2 Viday bench trial.
Course of Proceedings
In the trial court, Mr. Seethaler was one of three plaintiffs who sued the Calls in
this boundary dispute.12 The other plaintiffs, Lawrence and Jennifer Emery (husband and
wife), own two parcels of real property (the "Emery Property") that adjoin both Mr.
Seethaler's real property (the "Seethaler Property") and the Call Property.13 The Emerys
stayed involved in this case through the Final Judgment and Decree issued by the trial
court. In addition, the Emerys accepted payments from the Calls of court-awarded
damages, joined Mr. Seethaler in submitting the Notice of Appeal,14 and then moved this
Court to withdraw from the appeal15 - which motion was granted.16
In their Complaint, the plaintiffs brought one tort claim - trespass - emd three
equitable claims: 1) boundary by acquiescence; 2) prescriptive easement for use of land;
and 3) prescriptive easement for drainage.17 It appears from the transcript of the 2004

12

Complaint, R at 3-9.

13

Id.

14

R. at 487.

15

R at 461- 462, 480-482, R 483; this Court's Order of Dismissal dated May 20,

16

Order of Dismissal dated May 20, 2008.

2008.

17

Complaint, R at 3-9.
5

bench trial that the plaintiffs' trespass claim was limited to seeking damages for six box
elder trees that were removed by Mr. Call and two spruce trees on the Emery Property
that might have been harmed by the construction of the cement wall and the dumping of
additional soil on the Calls' side of the wall.18
At the conclusion of a 2 Vi-day trial in the summer of 2004, the plaintiffs prevailed
on their pleaded claims of: 1) boundary by acquiescence; 2) prescriptive easement for
drainage; and 3) trespass (to the extent damages were ultimately awarded for losses
related to trees).19 In addition, the plaintiffs prevailed on one claim not pleaded: 4)
boundary by deed and survey.20 All of the Calls' causes of action in their counterclaim
were dismissed by the trial court at the conclusion of the first 2 V2-day trial.21
In effect, the trial court bifurcated the case, holding a 2 ^-day bench trial on
liability issues and tree damages in the summer of 2004 and conducting equity
proceedings on November 28, 2006 and November 19, 2007 to determine remedies for
the plaintiffs' equitable claims, including matters related to the boundary dispute, the
cement wall and drainage.22 However, both the November 28, 2006 and November 19,

18

T. Vol. Ill, p. 67.

19

2005 Findings, R. at 195-215; 2005 Judgment, R. at 189-194.

20

Id.

21
22

2005 Judgment, R at 194, f 10.
T. Vol. Ill, pp. 68, 112; 2006 T., p. 2.
6

2007 equity proceedings also involved the trial court making adjustments to the damages
for the two spruce trees on the Emery Property.23
Disposition in the Court Below
In the trial court, the issue of the parties' good faith versus bad faith was raised
multiple times. During the November 28, 2006 equity proceedings, the trial court
stated:24
Here's the problem. Both sides suggest that they coached, for
lack of a better term, their surveyors. .. . I'm not going to conclude
that one survey or another was drawn because somebody suggested
that this is where it ought to be. That simply accuses these surveyors
of impropriety. I don't think there's any evidence that either of them
have been. I think the evidence si that they all did the best job
possible and I have to make a decision on which one to rely on.
I will make a finding right now, in anticipation of a final
decision, that I find no bad faith on either part in this case.
There's a deplorable lack of communication and I think a fairly
deplorable lack of cooperation, but not motivated by any bad faith. I
think both parties acted in their self-interest, but I think they did so in
good faith.
I'm going to make a finding here that neither party acted in what I
consider bad faith. I think both parties acted in good faith. There
could have been more communication. {Emphasis added.)
At the conclusion of nearly five years of litigation between the parties below, the
trial court's bottom-line disposition of all the issues was as follows:

23

Interim Findings 2006, R. at 439, 441-442, <H 14, 23-24; Final Findings 2007, R.

at 477.
24

2006 T., pp. 124, 139, 145.
7

•

The trial court found in equity "that all parties in this matter acted in good

faith and that no party acted in bad faith."25
•

The survey performed by the plaintiffs surveyor was recorded as "reflecting

the property lines and boundaries between the Seethaler and Call property and the Emery
and Call property, respectively."26
•

The cement wall constructed by Mr. Call between the Seethaler Property

and the Call Property was found at trial to lie on Mr. Seethaler's side of the
boundary line as determined by the plaintiffs' surveyor and accepted by the trial court to
be the correct boundary line.27
•

In fashioning equitable remedies, the trial court found that: "It is not

equitable or appropriate to order removal of the cement wall as erected by the
Defendants on what has been determined to be the Plaintiffs1 property because it is
economically unfeasible and unreasonable to require removal of the wall and
because of the cost to rebuild the wall a few feet away."28 Accordingly, the trial court
found that it is "equitable to leave the property ownership as it is currently, with
occupancy of the property from the cement wall south to be by the [Calls].

25

Interim Findings 2007, R. at 437, f 1.

26

2007 Interim Judgment, R. at 433; see also 2005 Judgment, R. at 192.

27

2005 Findings, R. at 189-194; 2007 Interim Findings, R. at 437-446.

28

2007 Interim Findings, R. at 438, f 2 (emphasis added.).
8

Occupancy of the cement wall north shall be by the Plaintiffs (Mr. Seethaler and the
Emerys)."29
•

In accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid Mr.

Seethaler $8,900 for use of the 612 square of his property that the trial court found was
south of the cement wall but north of the boundary line determined by the plaintiffs'
surveyor and accepted by the court.30
•

In accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid Mr.

Seethaler an additional $500 for 20 years of anticipated property taxes for the 612 square
feet of real property south of the cement wall.31
•

In accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid the

Emery plaintiffs $6,750 for 400 square feet of their property that the trial court found was
south of the cement wall but north of the boundary line determined by the plaintiffs'
surveyor and accepted by the trial court.32
•

In accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid the

Emery plaintiffs an additional $400 for 20 years of anticipated property taxes for the 400

29

2007 Judgment, R. at 433; 2007 Findings, R. at 438, f 1 (emphasis added).

30

R. at 461; 2007 Interim Judgment at 433; 2007 Interim Findings at 439.

31

R. at 461; 2007 Interim Judgment at 433; 2007 Interim Findings at 439, 440.

32

R. at 461; 2007 Interim Judgment at 433; 2007 Interim Findings at 439.
9

square feet of real property south of the cement wall.
•

Apparently in relation to the plaintiffs' trespass claim, the Calls paid the

plaintiffs a total of $18,715 for removal of six box elder trees and anticipated damage to
two large fir trees.34
»•

The trial court found that the Calls were responsible for managing drainage

of water from the plaintiffs' properties because the trial court determined that the
plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement to drain water onto the Call Property.35 In
accordance with the trial court's equitable remedies, the Calls paid the plaintiffs $3,384
to build a sump that would handle drainage of water that, before construction of the
cement wall, had flowed onto the Call Property.36
»

Ruling in equity, the trial court awarded the Emery plaintiffs perpetual use

of one parking space on the Calls property to replace the use of one of the Emery s1
parking spaces that the trial court found was lost as a result of construction of the
concrete wall.37

33

R. at 461; 2007 Judgment at 433; 2007 Findings at 439, 440.

34

2007 Judgment, R. at 216

35

2005 Findings, R. at 208, If 103; 2007 Findings, R. at 438,ffif9-13; 2007 Decree,
R. at 433,1| 4.
36

R. at 461; 2007 Judgment at 433; 2007 Findings at 439, ^ 13.

37

2007 Interim Findings, R. at 440, ^ 19; 2007 Interim Judgment, R. at 433,1f 10.
10

•

As directed by the Court, the Calls paid the plaintiffs' court costs of

$1,218.38
•

In total, the Calls have paid the plaintiffs the foil $39,867 awarded by the

trial court as damages for the plaintiffs' various claims.39
STATEMENT O F FACTS
1.

The parties to this lawsuit own adjoining parcels of real property in Logan,

on which are located three different apartment complexes.40
2.

Since 1988, the Emery plaintiffs have owned two fourplex units that were

constructed in the late 1960s and are known as the Island Inn Apartments.41 Since 1988,
Mr. Seethaler has owned a 36-unit apartment complex that was constructed in 1972 and is
known as Cambridge Court.42
3.

In 1993, the Calls began to develop fourplex apartment buildings on the

Call Property by obtaining a survey from Wayne Crow (the "Crow Survey"), having a site
plan prepared, and obtaining permits from Logan City.43 At the time, the Call Property

38

R. at 461; 2007 Interim Judgment at 433; 2007 Interim Findings at 439.

39

R. at 216, 461, 483.

40

2005 Findings, R. at 197, ^ 4; T. Vol. I, pp. 62-63.

41

T. Vol. I at 35, 62-63, 88-89.

42

2005 Findings, R. at p. 197, If 1f 5,6; T Vol. I, pp. 11, 21,

43

2005 Findings, R. at 197, ^ 10.
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was unimproved pasture land and the development of the Calls' apartments was a parttime project for Mr. Call, who was then working as a school teacher.44 In 1993, Logan
City authorized Mr. Call to construct five fourplex apartment units on the Call Property.45
4.

The 1993 Crow Survey identified an existing fence line as the boundary

between the Call Property to the south and the Seethaler Property and Emery Property to
the north.46
5.

In 1994, Mr. Call spoke with Plaintiff Larry Emery and Mr. Seethaler about

the Call Property, explaining his development plans and discussing drainage issues.47
6.

In 1994, the Calls began constructing apartment buildings on the south side

of the Call Property - which is on the opposite side of the property from the boundary
with the Seethaler Property and the Emery Property.48
7,.

In the fall of 2001, Mr. Call commissioned Lane Smith ("Mr. Smith") of

Knighton and Crow to perform a new survey (the "Smith Survey") of the Call Property
because the 1993 Crow Survey showed the northeast side of the Call Property was
approximately 2 feet short of the property described in the metes and bounds description

T. Vol. I, p. 128; 2006 T., p. 26;
T. Vol. I, pp. 131-132.
2005 Findings, R. at 197, ^ 10.
T. Vol. I, p. 38; 2006 T., pp. 25-26, 52-53;
2005 Findings, R. at 197,^9;
12

of the Calls' deed and Mr. Call could not find a survey pin from the Crow Survey on the
northwest side of the Call Property.49
8.

In retaining Mr. Smith to conduct the Smith Survey, Mr. Call did not

instruct Mr. Smith to find a particular boundary line on the north side of the Call
Property.50 Rather, Mr. Call noted that the 1993 Crow Survey appeared to follow a fence
line on the north side of the Call Property and the Crow Survey left the Call Property with
approximately 2 feet less property than was called out in the metes and bounds
description of the warranty deed to the Call Property that Mr. Call's mother had executed
in favor of the Calls.51 Mr. Call requested that Mr. Smith find the property lines as set
forth in the parties' respective deeds and take any deficiency, if any was found to exist,
from the Call Property.52
9*

In November 2001, Mr. Smith staked out the northern boundary of the Call

Property as he had determined it to be from his survey that month.53 Mr. Smith testified
at trial that the Smith Survey provided the full amount of real property described in
the metes and bounds descriptions of the deeds to the parcels that are affected by this

9

T. Vol. I, p. 129, 136; 2006 T., pp. 102-103.

0

T. Vol. II, pp. 136, 140-156; 2006 T. pp. 103-104.

1

T. Vol. I, pp. 129, 135 ; T. Vol. II, p. 142.

2

T. Vol. I, pp. 135-136, T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143; 2006 T., pp. 103-104.

3

T 11/28/07, p. 26-27, 54
13

boundary dispute.
10.

In November 2001, Mr. Call placed metal fence posts at regular interval

along the northern boundary line (between the Call Property on the south and the Emery
Property and Seethaler Property on the north) as that boundary had been determined and
staked by Mr. Smith.55
11.

In November 2001, Mr. Call removed the remainder of an old fence that

was leaning on his side of the boundary staked by Mr. Smith.56
12.

There was considerable conflict in the testimony at trial about the location

of the old boundary-line cedar fence and whether there was a second, newer fence that
had been constructed south (on the Calls' side) of the old fence. On one hand, Mr. Call
recalled that in the 1980s his family (which then owned the Call Property) had
constructed a new fence south of the original fence, and it was that fence that was
incorrectly used in the Crow Survey to determine the boundary line.57 In addition, Logan
City Building Inspector John Chase, concrete contractor Steve Johnson and Mr. Call all
testified at trial that there was evidence of old fence posts in the trench Mr. Call dug for

54

T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143.

55

Id.

56

T. Vol. I, pp. 21-22, 24-25, 64,

57

T. Vol. I, pp. 151-156.
14

the footings for the cement wall at issue.58 On the other hand, former apartment owner
Sherwood Kirby, Mr. Seethaler and Mr. Emery all testified they believed that the
dilapidated fence that was removed in November 2001 was the boundary-line fence.59
Ultimately, the trial court found that "[o]nly one Fence Line existed, and the Crow Survey
and Hansen Survey both accurately described the location of that Fence Line.60
13.

In November 2001, Mr. Call invited Mr. Seethaler and Mr. Emery to meet

with Mr. Call to discuss, based on a Mr. Smith's survey, a discrepancy in the parties1
respective deeds as to their boundary line.61 There is a dispute in the record as to whether
Messrs. Seethaler and Emery objected to Mr. Call's description of the boundary line as
determined by Mr. Smith; Messrs. Seethaler and Emery testified they objected to the
Smith boundary, Mr. Call testified they did not express any concerns before he
constructed the cement wall in the spring of 2002.62 Ultimately, the trial court found that
"[t]he Defendants and their predecessors in interest never claimed the Fence Line to be
anything other than a boundary line.'*3

58

T. Vol I, pp 151-157 ;T. Vol. II, pp. 119, 122, 125-126, 132-136.

59

T. Vol I, pp. 14-16, 21, 53-54, 62-65, 106; 2006 T., p. 55

60

2005 Findings, R. at 204,170.

61

T. Vol. I, pp. 22, 52, 65, 78, 137-139; 2006 T., pp. 26-29; 54-58.

62

T. Vol. I, pp. 137-139; 2006 T, pp. 27-28, 54-57, 104-105.

63

2005 Findings, p. 201, f 32.
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14.

As of November 2001, the Seethaler Property had not been surveyed while

under Mr. Seethaler's ownership.64
15.

In late March or early April 2002, Mr. Call constructed a cement wall

between the Call Property on the south and the Emery Property on the North.65
16.

On April 11, 2002 - when he was notified by Messrs. Emery and Seethaler

that they believed the cement wall was not on the Call Property and that there were
drainage issues that must be resolved - Mr. Call ceased all work on his apartment project
at the north side of the Call Property so that he could resolve these issues with Messrs.
Seethaler and Emery.66
17.

Mr. Call arranged a meeting on May 13, 2002 between Mr. Emery, Mr.

Seethaler, Mr. Smith and himself to discuss the results of the Smith Survey and the
northern boundary of the Call Property.67
18.

Messrs. Seethaler and Emery delivered to Mr. Call a letter dated May 28,

2002 objecting to Mr. Call proceeding with construction of his apartment project without
first obtaining a "Boundary Agreement" with Messrs. Seethaler and Call.68

64

T. Vol. 1, p. 47.

65

2005 Findings, R. at 199, % 19; T. Vol. I, p. 64; 2006 T., pp. 31, 106, 110.

66

2006 T., p. 118.

67

2006 T., pp. 31-32, 111-112, 116-117.

68

Plaintiffs' Ex. 23, which is Exhibit E in Addendum to Brief of Appellant; T. Vol.

I, p. 28.
16

19.

In late June 2002, Mr. Seethaler and Mr. Emery retained Jeff Hansen ("Mr.

Hansen") to perform a survey (the "Hansen Survey") that would determine the boundary
line between the Call Property and their respective parcels.69 The Hansen Survey was
completed on July 15, 2002.70
20.

Except for receiving loads of fill dirt in June 2002, Mr. Call did not perform

any work on his apartment project until September 2002 because he was waiting to
resolve the boundary dispute with Messrs. Seethaler and Emery, who never made any
proposals or effort to resolve the dispute during the summer of 2002.7l
21.

In the March 2003, Mr. Call constructed the cement wall between the Call

Property and the Seethaler Property.72 Before constructing that portion of the cement wall
- which was inside the boundary set by the Smith Survey but outside boundary set by the
Hansen Survey - Mr. Call consulted with his then-attorney, Ray Malouf, and officials
with the Logan City.73
22.

On March 31, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their Complaint against the Calls.

2006 T., pp. 29
2005 Findings, R. at 198, f 14.
T. 11/28/06, pp. 118-127.
T. 11/28/06, pp. 129
2006 T., p. 128.
17

23.

The cement wall between the parties' properties serves a dual purpose: it is

the base of a fence that will ultimately extend three to six feet above the wall and a
retaining wall.74
24.

At trial, Cache County Surveyor Preston Ward testified that he preferred the

methodology used by Mr. Smith in performing the Smith Survey, that is, taking
measurements and gathering information from inside the city block where the surveyed
property lies, rather than going outside the block.75 Although not rejecting Mr. Ward's
testimony entirely, the trial court minimized its persuasive impact on the court's findings
when it accepted the Hansen Survey as the most persuasive survey.76
25.

It appears from the transcript of proceedings below that the trial court was

very concerned about the conduct of the Calls' original counsel, Ray Malouf, in the 2 Viday trial in the summer of 2004; the trial court went so far as to mention Rule 11 on the
first day of the trial.77

74

2006 T., pp. 128, 129.

75

T. Vol. II, pp. 171-178.

76

2005 Findings, R. at 206-207, <H 88-91.

77

T. Vol. I, pp. 156-157 (The Court: "Sustained. Mr. Malouf, this testimony is not
helpful, particularly given our discussion in chambers."), 159 (The Court: "That's
inappropriate and in violation of Rule 11."); T. Vol. Ill, p. 113 (The Court: "I took Mr.
Malouf in chambers and discussed with him some substantial concerns that were
becoming very obvious, and I suspect counsel's a lot of money every day, and I suggested
that resolution be sought at that time.")
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SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT
This is a case in equity revolving around a boundary dispute. The trial court, using
its considerable latitude and discretion in equitable matters, fashioned multiple equitable
remedies, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances provided to the court
during nearly five years of litigation below. This Court should not disturb the trial court's
remedies.
Mr. Seethaler failed to present to the trial court - and, hence, preserve - two
claims: 1) that he was "irreparably harmed" and 2) that the trial court granted the Calls a
de facto right of condemnation. Mr. Seethaler further failed to present to the trial court
any request for - and any legal basis for - injunctive relief regarding removal of a cement
wall constructed by the Calls.
By presenting testimony of a surveyor as to the square footage of a small sliver of
land that was on the Calls1 side of the cement wall and by presenting the testimony of a
property appraiser as to the value of a square foot of the Seethaler Property, Mr. Seethaler
invited the money damages he was awarded by the trial court in equity for loss of use of
the small sliver of land.
In his challenge to a finding of fact, Mr. Seethaler failed to marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's finding that all the parties acted in good faith and none of the
parties acted in bad faith. This Court should not reverse that finding.
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ARGUMENT
I.

Given its findings on the disputed boundary, the trial court crafted
appropriate equitable remedies below.
The Calls disagree with the trial court's core finding that the Crow Survey and the

Hansen Survey are more reliable than the Smith Survey. Accordingly, the Calls disagree
with the trial court's ultimate finding that their northern boundary is several feet short of
the boundary determined by the Smith Survey.
That said, the most important point the Calls want to make to this Court is that the
trial court's findings and rulings under review were made in an equitable proceeding. As
noted above, the trial court resolved multiple claims - pleaded and unpleaded - by the
parties. The litigation below lasted nearly five years, was hard fought, involved multiple
issues, and saw the Calls change counsel after the first 2 V2 days of trial. In the end - as
so often happens in complicated cases in equity - parties on both sides of the lawsuit left
the courthouse feeling aggrieved. The Calls, for example, have paid a total of $39,867 in
court-awarded damages to Mr. Seethaler and the Emery plaintiffs for damages related to
construction of a cement wall on their side of the boundary line determined by the Smith
Survey. And Mr. Seethaler - despite having his own counsel draft all of the findings of
fact, all of the conclusions of law and the three judgments and decrees issued by the trial
court - is appealing one of the many findings of fact and one of the many equitable
remedies crafted by the trial court to resolve this dispute.
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The second most important point the Calls want to make is that the trial court
fully understood its duties and responsibilities in formulating equitable remedies in
the lawsuit below. The trial court's prelude to its rulings in the equity proceeding on
November 28, 2006 began as follows:
First, this is a case in equity. Equity means what is right
and reasonable. What I'm called upon to do as the judge in this
case is to decide what is right and reasonable. When I say right, I
don't mean necessarily right under the law, what I mean is right in all
of the circumstances considered. Practical, legal, financial,
economical and recognizing properly rights.
Property rights are unique. There's no question about it.
There's only so much land in this world and every bit it is unique.
Ownership of it is critically important to people. There are
substantial, including constitutional, rights addressed by - affecting
property rights.
Having said that, one of the principles in equity is that
those who seek equity must do equity. Allegations on both sides
are that some of the parties have acted if in not bad faith, their
actions were lacking in good faith. There is a difference between
those two in the eyes of the law. Quite frankly, so much occurred
here, so much lack of communication, so much self-interest, though
not inappropriate self-interest. Things could have been done better
but weren't. As a result of that, we have the mess we're in now.
{Emphasis added.)n
Both before and after the prelude, the trial court found that none of the parties had
acted in bad faith and that all of the parties had acted in good faith.79 he court made its
next significant ruling in equity on November 28, 2006:

2006 T., pp. 144-145.
2006 T., pp. 124, 139,145.
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I'll first find that it is not equitable nor judicially appropriate to
order removal of that wall. I'm not going to order it. I think
that would be inequitable, inappropriate, economically
unfeasible and unreasonable in every aspect. {Emphasis added./0
The trial court explained its reasons for leaving the cement wall in place: 1) the
high cost of removing and rebuilding the wall; 2) construction of the wall "has not
resulted in a loss to [Mr.] Seethaler of any parking"; 3) the City of Logan could have been
brought into the lawsuit as a party so the court could adjudicate Mr. Seethaler's rights visa-vis the city regarding conforming or non-conforming uses (such as parking), but the city
was never made a party; and 4) the wall is more "esthetieally pleasing" than the "broken
down, tumbled down, dilapidated, deferred maintained fence with junk and garbage and
trash accumulating, including vegetation dead and alive."81
The starting point for this Court's analysis of the case law on equitable remedies is
found in Ockey v. Lehmer:S2
The availability of a remedy is a legal conclusion that we review for
correctness. However, a trial court is accorded considerable latitude
and discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy, and
[it] will not be overturned unless it [has] abused its discretion.

2006 T, p. 146.
2006 T., pp. 147-150.
Ockey v. Lehmer, 2008 UT 37, ^ 42, 189 P.3d 51,61.
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In the footnote to this quotation from the Ockey decision, the Supreme Court cited
to Thurston v. Box Elder County^ as "holding that the availability of an equitable remedy
is reviewed for correctness but that the trial court's application and formulation of an
equitable remedy is reviewed for abuse of discretion."
The fundamental question for this Court, then, is whether the trial court's
decisions to (i) leave the cement wall in place, (ii) give the Calls use of a small sliver
of land on their side of the wall, and (iii) compensate Mr, Seethaler with money
damages are appropriate equitable remedies.
The Supreme Court in Hughes v. Caffertyu provides excellent guidance in
understanding a court of equity's broad authority to resolve disputes:
All parties concede this is a case in equity, and equity
cases afford courts discretion and latitude in fashioning
equitable remedies. Although the court of appeals could have
provided a more comprehensive opinion discussing all of the equities
present in this case, it was not required to do so. A court acting in
equity is not required to recite its decision in terms of specific factors
or to adhere to formulaic tests. Rather, its obligation is to effectuate a
result that serves equity given the overall facts and circumstances of
the individual case. {Emphasis added.)
In the footnote to the above quotation from the Hughes decision, the Supreme
Court elaborated:85

83

Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1040-41 (UT 1995) {emphasis in
original).
84

Hughes v. Cafferty, 2004 UT 22,124, 89 P.3d 148, 153.

85

Id at fn. 2, quoting State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (UT 1994).
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Because decisions in equity are based on the overall facts and
circumstances of each individual case, it is appropriate to give
considerable deference to the trial court:
[I]t is before [the trial] court that the witnesses and parties
appear and the evidence is adduced. The judge of that court is
therefore considered to be in the best position to assess the
credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the
proceeding as a whole, something an appellate court cannot
hope to garner from a cold record.
Finally - in conjunction with its affirmation of the trial court's balancing the
equities - the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Cafferty contrasted the confines of legal
rulings with the flexibility of equitable rulings:86
The distinguishing characteristics of legal remedies are their
uniformity, their unchangeableness or fixedness, their lack of
adaptation to circumstances, and the technical rules which govern
their use.... Equitable remedies, on the other hand, are distinguished
by their flexibility, their unlimited variety, [and] their adaptability to
circumstances.... [T]he court of equity has the power of devising
its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances
of every case and the complex relations of all the parties.87
Each case presents unique facts and circumstances. What is
relevant or persuasive in one equity decision may be meaningless in
another context. "As in much else that pertains to equitable
jurisdiction, individualization in the exercise of a discretionary
power will alone retain equity as a living system and save it from
sterility." {Emphasis added.)™

86

Id at 2004 UT 22,ffl[26-27, 89 P.3d at 153-154.

87

Quoting Spencer W. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 109 (5th
ed.1941).
88

Quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83
L.Ed. 1184(1939).
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II.

Mr. Seethaler did not preserve his claim of "irreparable harm," and he
invited the remedy of money damages.
Mr. Seethaler claims in his brief - for the first time ever - that he has suffered

"irreparable harm" because the trial court did not order removal of the cement wall and
the "monetary damages awarded by the trial court were not adequate to compensate [Mr.]
Seethaler for the irreparable injury he suffered."89
However, Mr. Seethaler did not raise his claim of "irreparable harm" before the
trial court.90 As noted by this Court in Myrah v. Campbell:91 "In order to preserve an
issue for appeal, it must be ... sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the
trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority."
In addition, Mr. Seethaler should not be heard to complain about receiving money
damages for the Calls' use of the small sliver of land on their side of the cement wall.
Mr. Seethaler himself is the one who produced all the evidence relied uipon by the
trial court to award such monetary damages. In the November 28, 2006 equity
proceeding, Mr. Seethaler presented the testimony of surveyor Jeff Hansen, who
calculated for the trial court the amount of Mr. Seethaler's land on the Calls' side of the
cement wall (including the wall): 612 square feet.92 Then Mr. Seethaler presented the

89

Brief of Appellant, p. 18.

90

R. at 1-487; T. Vols. I, II, III; 2006 T.; 4/2/2007 T.; 7/9/2007 T.; 11/19/2007 T.

91

Myrah v. Campbell 2007 UT App. 168, \ 18,163 P.3d 679, 683.

92

T. 11/28/06, pp. 43-45
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testimony of property appraiser Tom Singleton, who testified to the market value of the
small sliver of Mr. Seethaler's land on the Calls' side of the wall: $8900.93 Mr. Singleton
even testified that he valued the Seethaler Property at $13 per square foot using a
"methodology" he uses for determining the value of this property in a "taking."94 Mr.
Singleton also testified to the tax rate that would be used to calculate Mr. Seethaler's taxes
on the sliver of land: $21.60 per year.95
If Mr. Seethaler did not want the trial court to award money damages for the small
sliver of his property on the Calls' side of the wall, he should not have presented evidence
leading the court directly to that remedy.
Moreover, "irreparable harm" is a term of art in equity. Regarding "irreparable
harm," The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Hermes Associates, LTD stated:96
"Irreparable harm," a term often interchanged with "irreparable
injury," is defined as "a harm that a court would be unable to remedy
even if the movant would prevail in the final adjudication." We have
also explained that irreparable injury consists of "wrongs of a
repeated and continuing character, or which occasion damages that
are estimated only by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard."
A party proves irreparable injury when establishing that "he or she is
unlikely to be made whole by an award of monetary damages or

93

2006 T., pp. 64-74.

94

2006 T., pp. 65-70.

95

2006 T., pp. 74-75.

96

Johnson v. Hermes Associates, LTD, 2005 UT 82, f 18 128 P.3d 1151,1157,
quoting 42 Am.Jur.2d Injunctions § 33 (2004); citing 13 Moore's Federal Practice §
65.06[2] (3d ed.2005) and Carrier v. Lindquist, 2001 UT 105, f 29, 37 P.3d 1112.
It

some other legal, as opposed to equitable, remedy.... Thus, an injury
is irreparable if the damages are estimable only by conjecture and not
by any accurate standard."
Given that Mr. Seethaler himself presented the trial court with all the evidence
necessary to calculate reasonably accurate monetary damages for loss of use of 612
square feet of real property along the wall, Mr. Seethaler cannot prove that he is
irreparably harmed by leaving the cement wall in place and spending - or investing - the
money damages he has already received from the Calls.97
III.

Mr. Seethaler's cases do not support his assertion that he is entitled to a
different form of equitable relief.
Mr. Seethaler cites a number of cases in support of his position that he is entitled

to different equitable relief than what he was granted below: Strawberry Electric Service
District v. Spanish Fork City,98 Carrier v. Lundquist," Systems Concepts, Inc. v.
Dixon,100and Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center
Associates,101 The problem is, all of these are injunction cases. And Mr. Seethaler

97

R. 461-462.

98

Strawberry Electric Service District v. Spanish Fork City, 918 P,2d 870 (UT

99

Carrier v. Lundquist, 2001 UT 105, 37 P.3d 1112.

1996).

100

Systems Concepts, Inc. v. Dixon, 669 P.2d 421 (UT 1983)

101

Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates,
535 P.2d 1256 (UT 1975).
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never sought injunctive relief in the court below.102 Mr. Seethaler never provided the
trial court an opportunity to inquire into whether he would truly suffer irreparable harm if
the cement wall were allowed to remain. Indeed, in the year between the construction of
the cement wall along the Emery Property and the construction of the cement wall along
the Seethaler Property, Mr. Seethaler did not seek injunctive relief- which was an
available remedy if Mr. Seethaler indeed thought he would be irreparably harmed.103
After the plaintiffs filed their Complaint, Mr. Seethaler did not seek injunctive relief.
Again, this would have been an available remedy. Then, at the November 28, 2006
equity hearing, Mr. Seethaler presented evidence in support of monetary damages.
Even after the November 28, 2006 equity hearing in which the trial court ordered
the equitable remedies now under review, Mr. Seethaler did not request the trial court to
reconsider and grant him the injunctive relief he is now asking this Court to grant him.
There was an additional 14 months of litigation in this matter after the November 28,
2006 equity hearing - including the plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce Judgment and to Limit
Bench Ruling or for Reconsideration104 - but that additional litigation involved spruce
trees on the Emery Property, not injunctive relief.
102

R. at 1-487; T. Vols. I, II, III; 2006 T.; 4/2/2007 T.; 7/9/2007 T.; 11/19/2007 T.

103

Hunsaker v. Kersh, 991 P.2d 67, 69 ("A preliminary injunction is 'an
anticipatory remedy purposed to prevent the perpetration of a threatened wrong or to
compel the cessation of a continuing one.' It further serves to "preserve the status quo
pending the outcome of the case. "){Citations ommitted.)
104

R. at pp. 340-363.
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Only on appeal - after seeking and receiving monetary damages from the trial
court - does Mr. Seethaler decide that he would prefer a different form of equitable relief,
that is, injunctive relief ordering removal of the cement wall because of alleged
irreparable harm. By failing to raise the issue below, Mr. Seethaler waived any claim he
may have had to injunctive relief, or he at least failed to preserve the issue.105
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe the trial court would have ruled any
differently had it applied the "balancing of equities" test now advocated by Mr. Seethaler.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Carrier v. Lundquist:106
Under this test, the district court may in its discretion elect not
to grant an injunction only "where an encroachment does not
irreparably injure the plaintiff; was innocently made; the cosl of
removal would be disproportionate and oppressive compared to the
benefits derived from it, and plaintiff can be compensated by
damages." {Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)
The facts of this case would likely satisfy the balancing of equities test in the Calls'
favor had the trial court been given the opportunity to apply such a test. First, there was
no claim or finding below that Mr. Seethaler would be irreparably harmed by leaving the
wall in place. Indeed, the trial court specifically found:107

Myrah v. Campbell 2007 UT App. 168,1j 18,163 P.3d 679, 683.
Carrier v. Lundquist, 2001 UT 105,131,37 P.3d 1112, 120-121.
2006 T., p. 147.
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Additionally, the building of the wall and the eventual building of a
fence on top of it, which has been anticipated and reflected in the
testimony, has not resulted in a loss to Seethaler of any parking. All
the spaces are still there.
Second, while the Calls were certainly aware of Mr. Seethaler's boundary concerns
as early as April 11, 2002, six months earlier the Smith Survey had established a
definitive boundary, which Mr. Smith himself explained to Messers. Seethaler and Emery
in the spring of 2002.108 Only after a year of waiting for a boundary resolution and
consulting with his legal counsel and Logan City officials, did Mr. Call go forward with
construction of the wall along the Seethaler boundary.109
Third, the trial court addressed the issue of cost of removing the wall in its ruling
on November 28, 2006:110
I'll first find that it is not equitable nor judicially appropriate
to order removal of that wall. I'm not going to order it. I think that
would be inequitable, inappropriate, economically unfeasible and
unreasonable in every aspect. . . .
Whether it's [$]1900 or [$]2400 or [$] 18,000 or [$] 19,000
makes little difference. To remove [the wall] and reinstall it for the
purposes that Mr. Call wants would be another [$] 15,000 to build the
thing again. So you double the cost of that, plus the added cost to
remove it, so you're in the area of probably $30,000. That makes no
sense. It is unreasonable and inequitable and I so find.

108
109
110

2006 T., p. 31-32, 118,
T. Vol. I, p. 64; 2006 T , pp. 31, 106, 110, 118-129.
2006 T., p. 146-147.
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Finally, the trial court was able to accurately calculate Mr. Seethaler's damages for
the Calls' use of the sliver of land, using Mr. Seethaler's own witnesses - who presumably
testified for just that purpose. As to the Calls' occupancy of the sliver of the Seethaler
Property, the trial court ruled:111
As I said, there's been a loss of land by occupancy now of the
defendant, and which will continue to be occupied by him by my
decision in equity. That is by the Hansen survey 612 square feet of
plaintiff Seethaler land and 400 square feet of plaintiff Emery land.
By the Singleton calculations, that's $8900 in favor of plaintiff
Seethaler and $6750 in favor of plaintiff Emery. I award judgments
in those amounts.
Now, there's the tax issue which I asked Mr. Singleton about.
The taxes on the Seethaler portion of the property now occupied by
the defendant is $21.60 a year. That's expected to increase. But over
20 years that would be $432. I'm awarding judgment in favor of
Seethaler for $500 for taxes which he'll have to pay against property
that he does not have beneficial use of.
It is also important to emphasize that the balancing of equities test on which Mr.
Seethaler now hangs his hat does not require the trial court to order removal of the wall
even if it had found that the Calls don't satisfy the test: "Where the encroachment is
deliberate and constitutes a wilful and intentional taking of another's land, equity may
require its restoration, without regard for the relative inconveniences or hardships which
may result from its removal."112

111

2006 T., p. 156.

112

Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Associates,
535 P.2d 1256 (UT 197'5)(emphasis added).
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IV.

The Calls are not responsible for Mr. Seethalerfs parking problems.
In attempting to prove irreparable harm to this Court, Mr. Seethaler's brief

discusses at length Mr. Seethaler's parking problems and aesthetical concerns, which he
attributes to the cement wall.113 A few points should be made. First, regarding his
possible loss of parking spaces because of Logan City's road plans, Mr. Seethaler
testified:
Q.
Still showing a loss of 30 stalls and Mr. Call had
nothing to do with that; is that right?
A.
Right, he had nothing to do with that. These issues are
related to me, but they obviously have a lot of different aspects to
them and Mr. Call did not cause this.
Second, the trial court specifically addressed the aesthetics of the cement wall in
its ruling:114
I would suggest, frankly, given the history of this case, given
the photographs I've seen and so forth, that that wall is far more
esthetically pleasing than what was there before. There was a broken
down, tumbled down, dilapidated, deferred maintained fence with
junk and garbage and trash accumulating, including vegetation dead
and alive. Nothing had been done to beautify that side of the
property. If nothing else this wall does that.
Finally, the plaintiffs began the November 28, 2006 equity proceeding by
introducing into evidence Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1, which is an aerial photograph of the

113

Brief of Appellant, pp. 20-26.

114

2006 T., p. 150.
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parking situation at Mr. Seethaler's apartments as of the hearing date.115 As testified to by
Mr. Seethaler, there is a black line on Exhibit 1 showing the location of Mr. Seethaler's
property line as determined by the Hansen Survey and accepted by the trial court in the
summer 2004 trial.116 As acknowledged by Mr. Seethaler on cross examination, the
northern boundary of the Seethaler Property does not even extend to the sidewalk running
along the north side of that parcel:117
Q.
So my point is, Mr. Seethaler, that the north side of
your property doesn't even go to the sidewalk as it currently exists; is
that right?
A.
Umm, very likely. I don't want to say absolutely that I
know that to be true, but very possible.
The Calls propose there is a simple explanation for the gap between northern end
of the Seethaler Property and the city sidewalk to the north. That is, the Hansen Survey
effectively shifted the Seethaler Property to the south, leaving the gap. The original
property description of the Seethaler Property as set forth in the Complaint provided
300.32 feet along the eastern edge of the Seethaler Property.118 The Hansen Survey which was adopted by the trial court and included in the original Judgment and Decree
issued by the trial court - also provides 300.32 feet along the eastern edge of the

115

2006 T., p. 3-4.

116

2006 T., pp. 37-39; see also 2005 Judgment, R. at 193, f 5(c) for the new legal
description of the Seethaler Property.
117

2006 T., p. 39

118

R. at 4,^ 4.
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Seethaler Property.119
In contrast, Mr. Smith testified at trial that the Smith Survey provided the foil
amount of real property described in the metes and bounds descriptions of the deeds to the
four parcels (two Emery parcels, the Seethaler Property and the Call Property) that are
affected by this boundary dispute.120 Mr. Smith also testified that under the Smith Survey
"the deeds fit along the sidewalk on Canyon Road" (to the north of the Seethaler
Property) and the "north adjoining deeds . .. could fit within the block."121 Finally, Mr.
Smith testified that between the Smith Survey and 1993 Crow Survey there is a
difference of approximately 2 lA feet on the eastern boundary between the Seethaler
Property and the Call Property.122 This is the "deficiency" in deeded property that
prompted Mr. Call in November 2001 to request the Smith Survey in the first place.123
V.

Mr. Seethaler did not marshal the evidence to support his challenge to a key finding
of fact that all the parties acted in good faith.
If Mr. Seethaler wants to successfully challenge the trial court's finding of fact that

the parties acted in good faith and none acted in bad faith, then he must marshal evidence
in support of that finding:

119

2005 Judgment, R. at 193, \ 5(c).

120

T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143.

121

T. Vol. II, pp. 154, 156.

122

T. Vol. II, p. 144.

123

T. Vol. I, p. 129, 136.
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To successfully challenge an ultimate finding of fact, "an
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding
and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to
support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to
the court below."124
Mr. Seethaler did not marshal the evidence in his brief. Rather, he relentlessly
maintained the same drumbeat throughout his brief: Bad, bad, bad, bad, bad Mr. Call!
However, had Mr. Seethaler marshaled the evidence, he would have recognzied, among
other evidence presented to the trial court, that:
•

In the fall of 2001, Mr. Call commissioned the Smith Survey, which

resulted in the surveyed boundary being staked out in November 2001 - before the old
fence was removed and the trench dug for construction of the wall.125
•

Mr. Call testified that, in retaining Mr. Smith to conduct the Smith Survey,

Mr. Call did not instruct Mr. Smith to find a particular boundary line on the north side of
the Call Property.126 Rather, Mr. Call noted that the 1993 Crow Survey appeared to
follow a fence line on the north side of the Call Property and the Crow Survey left the
Call Property with approximately 2 feet less property than was called out in the metes and
bounds description of the warranty deed to the Call Property that Mr. Call's mother had

124

Parduhn v. Bennett, 2005 UT 22, \ 25, 112 P.3d 495, 502, quoting Chen v.
Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ^ 76, 100 P.3d 1177.
125

T. Vol. I, p. 129, 136; 2006 T., pp. 102-103.

126

T. Vol. II, pp. 136, 140-156; 2006 T. pp. 103-104.
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mother had executed in favor of the Calls.127 (Which deed was incidentally prepared by
the law firm of Mr. Seethaler's counsel, in case there are any concerns about the standard
reservations listed in the deed after the property description.)128 Mr. Call requested that
Mr. Smith find the property lines as set forth in the parties' respective deeds and take the
deficiency, if any was found to exist, from the Call Property.129
•

In November 2001, Mr. Smith staked out the northern boundary of the Call

Property as he had determined it to be from his survey that month.130 Mr. Smith testified
at trial that the Smith Survey provided the full amount of real property described in the
metes and bounds descriptions of the deeds to the four parcels that are directly affected by
this boundary dispute.131
•

There was considerable conflict in the testimony at trial about the location

of the old boundary-line cedar fence and whether there was a second, newer fence that
had been constructed south (on the Calls' side) of the old fence. Mr. Call testified that in
the 1980s his family (which then owned the Call Property) had constructed a new fence
south of the original fence, and it was that fence that was incorrectly used in the Crow

7

T. Vol. I, pp. 129, 135 ; T. Vol. II, p. 142.

8

The deed is Plaintiffs' Ex. 32; see 2007 Interim Findings, R. 313, f 7.

9

T. Vol. I, pp. 135-136, T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143; 2006 T., pp. 103-104.

°T 11/28/07, p. 26-27, 54
1

T. Vol. II, pp. 142-143.
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Survey to determine the boundary line.132 In addition, Logan City Building Inspector
John Chase, concrete contractor Steve Johnson and Mr. Call all testified at trial that there
was evidence of old fence posts in the trench Mr. Call dug for the footings for the cement
wall at issue.133
•

On April 11, 2002 - when he was notified by Messrs. Emery and Seethaler

that they believed the cement wall was not on the Call Property and that there were
drainage issues that must be resolved - Mr. Call ceased all work on his apartment project
at the north side of the Call Property so that he could resolve these issues with Messrs.
Seethaler and Emery.134
•

Mr. Call arranged a meeting on May 13, 2002 between Mr. Emery, Mr.

Seethaler, Mr. Smith and himself to discuss the results of the Smith Survey and the
northern boundary of the Call Property.
•

Except for receiving loads of fill dirt in June 2002, Mr. Call did not perform

any work on his apartment project until September 2002 because he was waiting to
resolve the boundary dispute with Messrs. Seethaler and Emery, who never made any
proposals or effort to resolve the dispute during the summer of 2002.135

132
133
134
135

T.Vol.I,pp.l51-156.

T. Vol I, pp 151-157 ;T. Vol. II, pp. 119, 122, 125-126, 132-136.
2006 T., p. 118.
T. 11/28/06, pp. 118-127.
37

•

In March 2003, Mr. Call constructed the portion of the cement wall between

the Call Property and the Seethaler Property.136 Before constructing that part of the
cement wall - all of which was inside the boundary set by the Smith Survey but outside
boundary set by the Hansen Survey - Mr. Call consulted with his then-attorney, Ray
Malouf, and officials with the Logan City.137
•

Mr. Call offered to help Mr. Seethaler move a storage shed that Mr. Call

believed was encroaching on the Call Property.138
Accordingly, Mr. Seethaler's challenge to the trial court's finding of fact that all
parties acted in good faith should be denied.
VI.

Mr. Seethaler did not preserve his claim of de facto condemnation.
Once again, Mr. Seethaler claims - for the first time ever on appeal - that the trial

court granted the Calls a de facto right to condemn a sliver of the Seethaler Property. As
noted by this Court in Myrah v. Campbell:139 "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it
must be ... sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court, and must
be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority."

T. 11/28/06, pp. 129
2006T.,p.l28.
T. Vol. I, p. 48.
Myrah v. Campbell, 2007 UT App. 168, ^ 18,163 P.3d 679, 683.
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In addition, it should be noted that on November 28, 2006 the trial court granted
two equitable remedies involving a party using another party's land. As Mr. Seethaler has
emphasized, repeatedly, the trial court awarded the Calls occupancy of a small sliver of
land south of the cement wall - much like a 20-year lease.140 At the same time, the trial
court awarded the Emery Plaintiffs a "perpetual easement" to one of the parking spaces
on the Call Property to compensate for the Emery plaintiffs' loss of a parking space when
the wall was constructed.141
CONCLUSION
There is no good legal or equitable reason for this Court to reverse the trial court
on any of the findings it made or any of the equitable remedies it granted. This was a
difficult case, by any measure. Mr. Seethaler is simply asking this Court to substitute its
judgment for that of the trial court, which sat through days of trials and hearings, waded
through scores of exhibits, reviewed scores of pages of pleadings, motions and
memoranda, and then did the best it could to formulate appropriate and workable
equitable remedies.
Another judge might have crafted somewhat different remedies, but that is nearly
always the case in equitable proceedings. (Indeed, another judge might have accepted the
Smith Survey as being the most accurate and reliable survey and dismissed the plaintiffs'
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2007 Interim Decree, R. at 433, f 6.
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2007 Interim Findings, R. at 440, f 19; 2007 Interim Decree, R. at 433, f 10.
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claims of boundary by acquiescence.) Mr. Seethaler certainly would like to see this Court
order removal of the cement wall. The Calls would like to think that had their original
lawyer proceeded differently early in this case, there might have been an entirely different
result. But it is time to end this litigation and let the parties move on with their lives.
Among the many reasons why Utah appellate courts apply the "abuse of discretion"
standard to cases:
The abuse of discretion standard recognizes both the district court's
ability to balance facts and craft equitable remedies and our
hesitance to act as a Monday morning quarterback in such matters.142
The judgments and decrees on appeal should be affirmed.
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